Outline

SSL/TLS
DNSSEC
Announcements intermission
The web from a security perspective
SQL injection
Web authentication failures

But wait, there’s more!
- Two recent problems, with cute names:
  - Heartbleed
    - Information-disclosure implementation bug in OpenSSL
    - Buffer over-read
  - POODLE: “Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption”
    - Padding oracle in SSL 3.0 returns when a MITM forces downgrade

CA vs. leaf checking bug
- Certs have a bit that says if they’re a CA
- All but last entry in chain should have it set
- Browser authors repeatedly fail to check this bit
- Allows any cert to sign any other cert

MD5 certificate collisions
- MD5 collisions allow forging CA certs
- Create innocuous cert and CA cert with same hash
  - Requires some guessing what CA will do, like sequential serial numbers
  - Also 200 PS3s
- Oh, should we stop using that hash function?

CA validation standards
- CA’s job to check if the buyer really is foo.com
- Race to the bottom problem:
  - CA has minimal liability for bad certs
  - Many people want cheap certs
  - Cost of validation cuts out of profit
- “Extended validation” (green bar) certs attempt to fix
HTTPS and usability

- Many HTTPS security challenges tied with user decisions
- Is this really my bank?
- Seems to be a quite tricky problem
  - Security warnings often ignored, etc.
  - We’ll return to this as a major example later

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DNS: trusted but vulnerable

- Almost every higher-level service interacts with DNS
- UDP protocol with no authentication or crypto
  - Lots of attacks possible
- Problems known for a long time, but challenge to fix compatibly

DNSSEC goals and non-goals

+ Authenticity of positive replies
+ Authenticity of negative replies
+ Integrity
  - Confidentiality
  - Availability

First cut: signatures and certificates

- Each resource record gets an RR SIG signature
  - E.g., A record for one name/address mapping
  - Observe: signature often larger than data
- Signature validation keys in DNSKEY RRs
- Recursive chain up to the root (or other “anchor”)

Add more indirection

- DNS needs to scale to very large flat domains like .com
- Facilitated by having single DS RR in parent indicating delegation
- Chain to root now includes DS es as well
Negative answers

- Also don’t want attackers to spoof non-existence
  - Gratuitous denial of service, force fallback, etc.
- But don’t want to sign "x does not exist" for all x
- Solution 1, NSEC: “there is no name between acacia and baobab”

Preventing zone enumeration

- Many domains would not like people enumerating all their entries
- DNS is public, but “not that public”
- Unfortunately NSEC makes this trivial
- Compromise: NSEC3 uses password-like salt and repeated hash, allows opt-out

DANE: linking TLS to DNSSEC

- "DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities"
- DNS contains hash of TLS cert, don’t need CAs
- How is DNSSEC’s tree of certs better than TLS’s?

Signing the root

- Political problem: many already distrust US-centered nature of DNS infrastructure
- Practical problem: must be very secure with no single point of failure
- Finally accomplished in 2010
  - Solution involves ‘key ceremonies’, international committees, smart cards, safe deposit boxes, etc.

Deployment

- Standard deployment problem: all cost and no benefit to being first mover
- Servers working on it, mostly top-down
- Clients: still less than 10%
- Will be probably common: insecure connection to secure resolver

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Upcoming assignments
- Exercise set 3 due tonight
- HA2 Q1-2 readable now
- HA2 materials coming probably Friday or over weekend
- Exercise set 4 posted soon, due 11/20

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Once upon a time: the static web
- HTTP: stateless file download protocol
  - TCP usually using port 80
- HTML: markup language for text with formatting and links
- All pages public, so no need for authentication or encryption

Web applications
- The modern web depends heavily on active software
- Static pages have ads, paywalls, or "Edit" buttons
- Many web sites are primarily forms or storefronts
- Web hosted versions of desktop apps like word processing

Server programs
- Could be anything that outputs HTML
- In practice, heavy use of databases and frameworks
- Wide variety of commercial, open-source, and custom-written
- Flexible scripting languages for ease of development
  - PHP, Perl, Ruby, etc.

Client-side programming
- Java: nice language, mostly moved to other uses
- ActiveX: Windows-only binaries, no sandboxing
  - Glad to see it on the way out
- Flash and Silverlight: most important use is DRM-ed video
- Core language: JavaScript
**JavaScript and the DOM**
- JavaScript (JS) is a dynamically-typed prototype-OO language
- No real similarity with Java
- Document Object Model (DOM): lets JS interact with pages and the browser
- Extensive security checks for untrusted-code model

**Same-origin policy**
- Origin is a tuple (scheme, host, port)
- E.g., (http, www.umn.edu, 80)
- Basic JS rule: interaction is allowed only with the same origin
- Different sites are (mostly) isolated applications

**GET, POST, and cookies**
- GET request loads a URL, may have parameters delimited with ?, &,
  =
  - Standard: should not have side-effects
- POST request originally for forms
  - Can be larger, more hidden, have side-effects
- Cookie: small token chosen by server, sent back on subsequent requests to same domain

**User and attack models**
- "Web attacker" owns their own site (www.attacker.com)
  - And users sometimes visit it
  - Realistic reasons: ads, SEO
- "Network attacker" can view and sniff unencrypted data
  - Unprotected coffee shop WiFi

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**Relational model and SQL**
- Relational databases have tables with rows and single-typed columns
- Used in web sites (and elsewhere) to provide scalable persistent storage
- Allow complex queries in a declarative language SQL
Example SQL queries

- SELECT name, grade FROM Students WHERE grade < 60 ORDER BY name;
- UPDATE Votes SET count = count + 1 WHERE candidate = 'John';

Template: injection attacks

- Your program interacts with an interpreted language
- Untrusted data can be passed to the interpreter
- Attack data can break parsing assumptions and execute arbitrary commands

SQL + injection

- Why is this named most critical web app. risk?
- Easy mistake to make systematically
- Can be easy to exploit
- Database often has high-impact contents
  - E.g., logins or credit cards on commerce site

Strings do not respect syntax

- Key problem: assembling commands as strings
  - "WHERE name = '$name';"
- Looks like $name is a string
- Try
  - $name = "me' OR grade > 80; --"

Using tautologies

- Tautology: formula that's always true
- Often convenient for attacker to see a whole table
- Classic: OR 1=1

Non-string interfaces

- Best fix: avoid constructing queries as strings
- SQL mechanism: prepared statement
  - Original motivation was performance
- Web languages/frameworks often provide other syntax
Retain functionality: escape

- **Sanitizing** data is transforming it to prevent an attack.
- **Escaped** data is encoded to match language rules for literal
  - E.g., `\n` and `\` in C
- But many pitfalls for the unwary:
  - Differences in escape syntax between servers
  - Must use right escape for context: not everything's a string

Lazy sanitization: whitelisting

- Allow only things you know to be safe/intended
- Error or delete anything else
- Short whitelist is easy and relatively easy to secure
  - E.g., digits only for non-negative integer
  - But, tends to break benign functionality

Poor idea: blacklisting

- Space of possible attacks is endless, don’t try to think of them all
- Want to guess how many more comment formats SQL has?
- Particularly silly: blacklisting `1=1`

Attacking without the program

- Often web attacks don’t get to see the program
  - Not even binary, it’s on the server
- Surmountable obstacle:
  - Guess natural names for columns
  - Harvest information from error messages

Blind SQL injection

- Attacking with almost no feedback
- Common: only “error” or “no error”
- One bit channel you can make yourself:
  - if (x) delay 10 seconds
- Trick to remember: go one character at a time

Injection beyond SQL

- XPath/XQuery: queries on XML data
- LDAP: queries used for authentication
- Shell commands: example from Ex. 1
- More web examples to come
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Per-website authentication

Many web sites implement their own login systems
+ If users pick unique passwords, little systemic risk
− Inconvenient, many will reuse passwords
− Lots of functionality each site must implement correctly
− Without enough framework support, many possible pitfalls

Building a session

HTTP was originally stateless, but many sites want stateful login sessions
Building by tying requests together with a shared session ID
Must protect confidentiality and integrity

Session ID: what

Must not be predictable
− Not a sequential counter
Should ensure freshness
− E.g., limited validity window
If encoding data in ID, must be unforgeable
− E.g., data with properly used MAC
− Negative example: crypt(username || server secret)

Session ID: where

Session IDs in URLs are prone to leaking
− Including via user cut-and-paste
Usual choice: non-persistent cookie
− Against network attacker, must send only under HTTPS
− Because of CSRF (next time), should also have a non-cookie unique ID

Session management

Create new session ID on each login
Invalidate session on logout
Invalidate after timeout
− Usability / security tradeoff
− Needed to protect users who fail to log out from public browsers
Account management

- Limitations on account creation
  - CAPTCHA? Outside email address?
- See previous discussion on hashed password storage
- Automated password recovery
  - Usually a weak spot
  - But, practically required for large system

Client and server checks

- For usability, interface should show what’s possible
- But must not rely on client to perform checks
- Attackers can read/modify anything on the client side
- Easy example: item price in hidden field

Direct object references

- Seems convenient: query parameter names resource directly
  - E.g., database key, filename (path traversal)
- Easy to forget to validate on each use
- Alternative: indirect reference like per-session table
  - Not fundamentally more secure, but harder to forget check

Function-level access control

- E.g. pages accessed by URLs or interface buttons
- Must check each time that user is authorized
  - Attack: find URL when authorized, reuse when logged off
- Helped by consistent structure in code

Next time

- Cross-site scripting and related risks
- Confidentiality and privacy risks