Null pointer dereference

- Add offset to make a predictable pointer
  - On Windows, interesting address start low
- Allocate data on the zero page
  - Most common in user-space to kernel attacks
  - Read more dangerous than a write

Format string attack

- Attacker-controlled format: little interpreter
- Step one: add extra integer specifiers, dump stack
  - Already useful for information disclosure

Format string attack layout
Format string attack: overwrite

- `%n` specifier: store number of chars written so far to pointer arg
- Advance format arg pointer to other attacker-controlled data
- Control number of chars written with padding
- On x86, use unaligned stores to create pointer

Outline

- Exploiting other vulnerabilities
- Return address protections
- Announcements intermission
- BCECHO demo
- ASLR and counterattacks
- W⊕X (DEP)
- Epilogue: BCVI Makefile

Canary in the coal mine

Photo credit: Fir0002 CC-BY-SA

Adjacent canary idea

Random canary

- Can’t reproduce because attacker can’t guess
- For efficiency, usually one per execution
- Ineffective if disclosed

Terminator canary

- Value hard to reproduce because it would tell the copy to stop
- StackGuard: 0x00 0D 0A FF
  - 0: String functions
  - newline: fgets(), etc.
  - -1 getc()
  - carriage return: similar to newline?
- Doesn’t stop: memcpy, custom loops
### XOR canary
- Want to protect against non-sequential overwrites
- XOR return address with value $c$ at entry
- XOR again with $c$ before return
- Standard choice for $c$: see random canary

### Further refinements
- More flexible to do earlier in compiler
- Rearrange buffers after other variables
  - Reduce chance of non-control overwrite
- Skip canaries for functions with only small variables
  - Who has an overflow bug in an 8-byte array?

### What’s usually not protected?
- Backwards overflows
- Function pointers
- Adjacent structure fields
- Adjacent static data objects

### Where to keep canary value
- Fast to access
- Buggy code/attacker can’t read or write
- Linux/x86: $\%gs:0x14$

### Complex anti-canary attack
- Canary not updated on fork in server
- Attacker controls number of bytes overwritten

### Complex anti-canary attack
- Canary not updated on fork in server
- Attacker controls number of bytes overwritten
- $\text{ANRY BNRY CNRY DNRY ENRY FNRY}$
- $2^{32} \rightarrow \text{search } 4 \cdot 2^8$
Shadow return stack

- Suppose you have a safe place to store the canary
- Why not just store the return address there?
- Needs to be a separate stack
- Ultimate return address protection

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You may notice

- We’re catching up with the readings
- Today: StackGuard, ASLR attacks
- Next time: CFI, Shacham ROP

Pre-proposals due tonight

- Most groups formed?
- One PDF per group, include schedule choices
- Submit via Moodle by 11:55pm

Supplemental office hours tomorrow

- Tomorrow (Thursday), 11am-noon in 4-225E
- Are my regular office hours at bad times?

HA1 reminders

- Attack 2 due Friday, harder than attack 1
- Keep backups if you need to reset VM
- Consider Moodle or email to both staff with questions
BCECHO

- An even simpler buffer overflow example
- Can compile like BCVI, install setuid root
- Will use for attack demo purposes

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Basic idea

- "Address Space Layout Randomization"
- Move memory areas around randomly so attackers can't predict addresses
- Keep internal structure unchanged
  - E.g., whole stack moves together

Code and data locations

- Execution of code depends on memory location
- E.g., on 32-bit x86:
  - Direct jumps are relative
  - Function pointers are absolute
  - Data must be absolute

Relocation (Windows)

- Extension of technique already used in compilation
- Keep table of absolute addresses, instructions on how to update
- Disadvantage: code modifications take time on load, prevent sharing
PIC/PIE (GNU/Linux)

- "Position-Independent Code / Executable"
- Keep code unchanged, use register to point to data area
- Disadvantage: code complexity, register pressure hurt performance

What's not covered

- Main executable (Linux 32-bit PIC)
- Incompatible DLLs (Windows)
- Relative locations within a module/area

Entropy limitations

- Intuitively, entropy measures amount of randomness, in bits
- Random 32-bit int: 32 bits of entropy
- ASLR page aligned, so at most $32 - 12 = 20$ bits of entropy
- Other constraints further reduce possibilities

Leakage limitations

- If an attacker learns the randomized base address, can reconstruct other locations
- Any stack address $\rightarrow$ stack unprotected, etc.

GOT hijack (Müller)

- Main program fixed, libc randomized
- PLT in main program used to call libc
- Rewire PLT to call attacker's favorite libc functions
- E.g., turn printf into system

GOT hijack (Müller)

```
printf@plt:    jmp *0x8049678
...
```

```
system@plt:    jmp *0x804967c
...
```

```
0x8049678: <addr of printf in libc>
0x804967c: <addr of system in libc>
```
ret2pop (Müller)

- Take advantage of shellcode pointer already present on stack
- Rewrite intervening stack to treat the shellcode pointer like a return address
  - A long sequence of chained returns, one pop

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Non-writable code, $X \rightarrow \neg W$

- E.g., read-only .text section
- Has been standard for a while, especially on Unix
- Lets OS efficiently share code with multiple program instances

Basic idea

- Traditional shellcode must go in a memory area that is writable, so the shellcode can be inserted executable, so the shellcode can be executed
- But benign code usually does not need this combination
- $W \ xor \ X$, really: $\neg (W \wedge X)$

Non-executable data, $W \rightarrow \neg X$

- Prohibit execution of static data, stack, heap
- Not a problem for most programs
  - Incompatible with some GCC features no one uses
  - Non-executable stack opt-in on Linux, but now near-universal
Implementing $W \oplus X$

- Page protection implemented by CPU
  - Some architectures (e.g. SPARC) long supported $W \oplus X$
- x86 historically did not
  - One bit controls both read and execute
  - Partial stop-gap “code segment limit”
- Eventual obvious solution: add new bit
  - NX (AMD), XD (Intel), XN (ARM)

One important exception

- Remaining important use of self-modifying code: just-in-time (JIT) compilers
  - E.g., all modern JavaScript engines
- Allow code to re-enable execution per-block
  - mprotect, VirtualProtect
- Now a favorite target of attackers

Counterattack: code reuse

- Attacker can’t execute new code
- So, take advantage of instructions already in binary
- There are usually a lot of them
- And no need to obey original structure

Classic return-to-libc (1997)

- Overwrite stack with copies of:
  - Pointer to libc’s system function
  - Pointer to ”/bin/sh” string (also in libc)
- The system function is especially convenient
- Distinctive feature: return to entry point

Chained return-to-libc

- Shellcode often wants a sequence of actions, e.g.
  - Restore privileges
  - Allow execution of memory area
  - Overwrite system file, etc.
- Can put multiple fake frames on the stack
  - Basic idea present in 1997, further refinements

Beyond return-to-libc

- Can we do more? Oh, yes.
- Classic academic approach: what’s the most we could ask for?
- Here: “Turing completeness”
- How to do it: reading for Thursday
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BCVI Makefile
CFLAGS := -g -Wall -m32 \
-fno-stack-protector \
-z execstack -z norelro

Standard non-security options

Turn off canaries

Allow execution on stack

Leave GOT writable
More HA1 VM unprotection

- Not in Makefile: disable ASLR
- Is done system-wide in VM
- For non-VM testing, can use `setarch i386 -R`

More HA1 VM unprotection

- Not in Makefile: disable `/bin/sh` privilege dropping
- Linux shells differ in whether they’ll run `setuid`
- Recompiled `dash` with security check removed

Next time

- Return-oriented programming (ROP)
  - And counter-defenses
- Control-flow integrity (CFI)