A couple more security goals

- Non-repudiation: principal cannot later deny having made a commitment
  - i.e., consider proving fact to a third party
- Forward secrecy: recovering later information does not reveal past information
  - Motivates using Diffie-Hellman to generate fresh keys for each session

Abstract protocols

- Outline of what information is communicated in messages
  - Omit most details of encoding, naming, sizes, choice of ciphers, etc.
- Describes honest operation
  - But must be secure against adversarial participants
- Seemingly simple, but many subtle problems

Protocol notation

\[ A \rightarrow B : N_B, (T_0, B, N_B)_{K_B} \]

- \( A \rightarrow B \): message sent from Alice intended for Bob
- \( B \) (after \( : \)): Bob's name
- \( \cdot \cdot \cdot \)_K: encryption with key \( K \)

Example: simple authentication

\[ A \rightarrow B : A, (A, N)_{K_A} \]

- E.g., Alice is key fob, Bob is garage door
- Alice proves she possesses the pre-shared key \( K_A \)
  - Without revealing it directly
- Using encryption for authenticity and binding, not secrecy

Nonce

\[ A \rightarrow B : A, (A, N)_{K_A} \]

- \( N \) is a nonce: a value chosen to make a message unique
- Best practice: pseudorandom
- In constrained systems, might be a counter or device-unique serial number

Replay attacks

- A nonce is needed to prevent a verbatim replay of a previous message
- Garage door difficulty: remembering previous nonces
  - Particularly: lunchtime/roommate/valet scenario
- Or, door chooses the nonce: challenge-response authentication
Man-in-the-middle attacks
- Gender neutral: middleperson attack
- Adversary impersonates Alice to Bob and vice-versa, relays messages
- Powerful position for both eavesdropping and modification
- No easy fix if Alice and Bob aren't already related

Chess grandmaster problem
- Variant or dual of MITM
- Adversary forwards messages to simulate capabilities with his own identity
- How to win at correspondence chess
- Anderson's MiG-in-the-middle

Anti-pattern: “oracle”
- Any way a legitimate protocol service can give a capability to an adversary
- Can exist whenever a party decrypts, signs, etc.
- "Padding oracle" was an instance of this at the implementation level

Outline
- Cryptographic protocols, pt. 1
- Key distribution and PKI
- Announcements intermission
- SSH
- SSL/TLS
- DNSSEC

Public key authenticity
- Public keys don't need to be secret, but they must be right
- Wrong key $\rightarrow$ can't stop MITM
- So we still have a pretty hard distribution problem

Symmetric key servers
- Users share keys with server, server distributes session keys
- Symmetric key-exchange protocols, or channels
- Standard: Kerberos
- Drawback: central point of trust

Certificates
- A name and a public key, signed by someone else
  - $C_A = \text{Sign}_B(A, K_A)$
- Basic unit of transitive trust
- Commonly use a complex standard "X.509"

Certificate authorities
- "CA" for short: entities who sign certificates
- Simplest model: one central CA
- Works for a single organization, not the whole world
Web of trust
- Pioneered in PGP for email encryption
- Everyone is potentially a CA: trust people you know
- Works best with security-motivated users
  - Ever attended a key signing party?

CA hierarchies
- Organize CAs in a tree
- Distributed, but centralized (like DNS)
- Check by follow a path to the root
- Best practice: sub CAs are limited in what they certify

PKI for authorization
- Enterprise PKI can link up with permissions
- One approach: PKI maps key to name, ACL maps name to permissions
- Often better: link key with permissions directly, name is a comment
  - More like capabilities

The revocation problem
- How can we make certs “go away” when needed?
- Impossible without being online somehow
  1. Short expiration times
  2. Certificate revocation lists
  3. Certificate status checking

Outline
Cryptographic protocols, pt. 1
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Announcements intermission
SSH
SSL/TLS
DNSSEC

Note to early readers
- This is the section of the slides most likely to change in the final version
- If class has already happened, make sure you have the latest slides for announcements

Short history of SSH
- Started out as freeware by Tatu Ylonen in 1995
- Original version commercialized
- Fully open-source OpenSSH from OpenBSD
- Protocol redesigned and standardized for “SSH 2”
SSH host keys

- Every SSH server has a public/private keypair
- Ideally, never changes once SSH is installed
- Early generation a classic entropy problem
  - Especially embedded systems, VMs

Authentication methods

- Password, encrypted over channel
- .shosts: like .rhosts, but using client host key
- User-specific keypair
  - Public half on server, private on client
- Plugins for Kerberos, PAM modules, etc.

Old crypto vulnerabilities

- 1.x had only CRC for integrity
- Worst case: when used with RC4
- Injection attacks still possible with CBC
- CRC compensation attack
- For least-insecure 1.x-compatibility, attack detector
- Alas, detector had integer overflow worse than original attack

Newer crypto vulnerabilities

- IV chaining: IV based on last message ciphertext
  - Allows chosen plaintext attacks
  - Better proposal: separate, random IVs
- Some tricky attacks still left
  - Send byte-by-byte, watch for errors
  - Of arguable exploitability due to abort
- Now migrating to CTR mode

SSH over SSH

- SSH to machine 1, from there to machine 2
  - Common in these days of NATs
- Better: have machine 1 forward an encrypted connection (cf. HA1)
  1. No need to trust 1 for secrecy
  2. Timing attacks against password typing

SSH (non-)PKI

- When you connect to a host freshly, a mild note
- When the host key has changed, a large warning

@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack).
It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.

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SSL/TLS
- Developed at Netscape in early days of the public web
  - Usable with other protocols too, e.g., IMAP
- SSL 1.0 pre-public, 2.0 lasted only one year, 3.0 much better
- Renamed to TLS with RFC process
  - TLS 1.0 improves SSL 3.0
- TLS 1.1 and 1.2 in 2006 and 2008, only gradual adoption

IV chaining vulnerability
- TLS 1.0 uses previous ciphertext for CBC IV
- But, easier to attack in TLS:
  - More opportunities to control plaintext
  - Can automatically repeat connection
- "BEAST" automated attack in 2011: TLS 1.1 wakeup call

Compression oracle vuln.
- Compr($S \parallel A$), where $S$ should be secret and $A$ is attacker-controlled
- Attacker observes ciphertext length
- If $A$ is similar to $S$, combination compresses better
- Compression exists separately in HTTP and TLS

But wait, there’s more!
- Too many vulnerabilities to mention them all in lecture
- Kaloper-Meršinjak et al. have longer list
- "Lessons learned" are variable, though
- Meta-message: don’t try this at home

HTTPS hierarchical PKI
- Browser has order of 100 root certs
  - Not same set in every browser
  - Standards for selection not always clear
- Many of these in turn have sub-CAs
- Also, “wildcard” certs for individual domains

Hierarchical trust?
- No. Any CA can sign a cert for any domain
- A couple of CA compromises recently
- Most major governments, and many companies you’ve never heard of, could probably make a google.com cert
- Still working on: make browser more picky, compare notes

CA vs. leaf checking bug
- Certs have a bit that says if they’re a CA
- All but last entry in chain should have it set
- Browser authors repeatedly fail to check this bit
- Allows any cert to sign any other cert

MD5 certificate collisions
- MD5 collisions allow forging CA certs
- Create innocuous cert and CA cert with same hash
  - Requires some guessing what CA will do, like sequential serial numbers
  - Also 200 PS3s
- Oh, should we stop using that hash function?
CA validation standards

- CA's job to check if the buyer really is \texttt{foo.com}
- Race to the bottom problem:
  - CA has minimal liability for bad certs
  - Many people want cheap certs
  - Cost of validation cuts out of profit
- "Extended validation" (green bar) certs attempt to fix

HTTPS and usability

- Many HTTPS security challenges tied with user decisions
- Is this really my bank?
- Seems to be a quite tricky problem
  - Security warnings often ignored, etc.
  - We'll return to this as a major example later

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DNS: trusted but vulnerable

- Almost every higher-level service interacts with DNS
- UDP protocol with no authentication or crypto
  - Lots of attacks possible
- Problems known for a long time, but challenge to fix compatibly

DNSSEC goals and non-goals

+ Authenticity of positive replies
+ Authenticity of negative replies
+ Integrity
  - Confidentiality
  - Availability

First cut: signatures and certificates

- Each resource record gets an \texttt{RRSIG} signature
  - E.g., \texttt{A} record for one name
  - Observe: signature often larger than data
- Signature validation keys in \texttt{DNSKEY} RRs
- Recursive chain up to the root (or other "anchor")

Add more indirection

- DNS needs to scale to very large flat domains like .com
- Facilitated by having single \texttt{DS} RR in parent indicating delegation
- Chain to root now includes \texttt{DSes} as well

Negative answers

- Also don't want attackers to spoof non-existence
  - Gratuitous denial of service, force fallback, etc.
- But don't want to sign "x does not exist" for all x
- Solution 1, \texttt{NSEC}: "there is no name between acacia and baobab"
Preventing zone enumeration

- Many domains would not like people enumerating all their entries
- DNS is public, but “not that public”
- Unfortunately NSEC makes this trivial
- Compromise: NSEC3 uses password-like salt and repeated hash, allows opt-out

DANE: linking TLS to DNSSEC

- "DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities"
- DNS contains hash of TLS cert, don’t need CAs
- How is DNSSEC’s tree of certs better than TLS’s?

Signing the root

- Political problem: many already distrust US-centered nature of DNS infrastructure
- Practical problem: must be very secure with no single point of failure
- Finally accomplished in 2010
  - Solution involves ‘key ceremonies’, international committees, smart cards, safe deposit boxes, etc.

Deployment

- Standard deployment problem: all cost and no benefit to being first mover
- Servers working on it, mostly top-down
- Clients: still less than 20%
- Will probably be common for a while: insecure connection to secure resolver

What about privacy?

- Users increasingly want privacy for their DNS queries as well
- Older DNSCurve and DNSCrypt protocols were not standardized
- More recent “DNS over TLS” and “DNS over HTTPS” are RFCs
- DNS over HTTPS in major browsers might have serious centralization effects