CSci 4271W Development of Secure Software Systems Day 22: Identity and Authentication

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Outline

More secure design principles

User authentication

Error rate trade-offs

Web authentication

Separate the control plane Defense in depth Keep metadata and code separate from untrusted data Bad: format string vulnerability Bad: old telephone systems Multiple levels of protection can be better than one Especially if none is perfect But, many weak security mechanisms don't add up

Canonicalize names


Use unique representations of objects
 E.g. in paths, remove . , . . , extra slashes, symlinks
 E.g., use IP address instead of DNS name

Fail-safe / fail-stop

If something goes wrong, behave in a way that's safe

- Often better to stop execution than continue in corrupted state
- E.g., better segfault than code injection





Password entropy

- Model password choice as probabilistic process
- **I**f uniform, $\log_2 |S|$
- Controls difficulty of guessing attacks
- Hard to estimate for user-chosen passwords Length is an imperfect proxy

Password hashing

- Idea: don't store password or equivalent information
- Password 'encryption' is a long-standing misnomer E.g., Unix crypt(3)
- Presumably hard-to-invert function h
- **Store only** h(p)

Dictionary attacks

- Online: send guesses to server
- Offline: attacker can check guesses internally
- Specialized password lists more effective than literal dictionaries
 - \blacksquare Also generation algorithms (s \rightarrow \$, etc.)
- ~25% of passwords consistently vulnerable

Better password hashing


Output Generate random salt s, store (s, h(s, p))

- Block pre-computed tables and equality inferences
- Salt must also have enough entropy

Deliberately expensive hash function

- AKA password-based key derivation function (PBKDF)
- Requirement for time and/or space

Password usability



- Distributed random passwords usually unrealistic
- Password aging: not too frequently
- Never have a fixed default password in a product



Centralized authentication

- 🖲 Enterprise-wide (e.g., UMN ID)
- Anderson: Microsoft Passport
- 🖲 Today: Facebook Connect, Google ID
- May or may not be single-sign-on (SSO)



- Authenticate by a physical body attribute
- + Hard to lose
- Hard to reset
- Inherently statistical
- Variation among people

Example biometrics

- 🖲 (Handwritten) signatures
- Fingerprints, hand geometry
- Face and voice recognition
- 🖲 Iris codes

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Imperfect detection

- Many security mechanisms involve imperfect detection/classification of relevant events
- Biometric authentication
- Network intrusion detection
- Anti-virus (malware detection)
- Anything based on machine learning

Detection results

True positive: detector says yes, reality is yes
 True negative: detector says no, reality is no
 False positive: detector says yes, reality is no
 False negative: detector says no, reality is yes
 Note: terminology may flip based on detecting good or bad

Why a trade-off?


- Imperfect methods have a trade-off between avoiding FPs and avoiding FNs
- Sometimes a continuous trade-off (curve), e.g. based on a threshold
 - E.g., spam detector "score"
- May need to choose both a basic mechanism and a threshold


Two ratios to capture the trade-off True positive rate:

$$\mathsf{TPR} = \frac{\mathsf{TP}}{\mathsf{P}} = \frac{\mathsf{TP}}{\mathsf{TP} + \mathsf{FN}} = 1 - \mathsf{FNR}$$

False positive rate:

$$FPR = \frac{FP}{N} = \frac{FP}{FP + TN} = 1 - TNR$$





Extreme biometrics examples

- exact_iris_code_match: very low false positive
 (false authentication)
- similar_voice_pitch: very low false negative
 (false reject)

Where are these in ROC space?

- A if (iris()) return REJECT; else return ACCEPT;
- B return REJECT;
- C if (iris()) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;
- D if (iris() && pitch()) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;
- E return ACCEPT;
- F if (rand() & 1) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;
- G if (pitch()) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;
- H if (iris() || pitch()) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;




Per-website authentication

Many web sites implement their own login systems

- $+ \,$ If users pick unique passwords, little systemic risk
- Inconvenient, many will reuse passwords
- $-\,$ Lots of functionality each site must implement correctly
- Without enough framework support, many possible pitfalls

Building a session

- HTTP was originally stateless, but many sites want stateful login sessions
- Built by tying requests together with a shared session ID
- Must protect confidentiality and integrity



Session ID: where

- Session IDs in URLs are prone to leaking
 - Including via user cut-and-paste
- Usual choice: non-persistent cookie
 - Against network attacker, must send only under HTTPS
- Because of CSRF, should also have a non-cookie unique ID



Account management

- Limitations on account creation CAPTCHA? Outside email address?
- See previous discussion on hashed password storage
- Automated password recovery
 - Usually a weak spot
 But, practically required for large system

Client and server checks

- For usability, interface should show what's possible
- But must not rely on client to perform checks
- Attackers can read/modify anything on the client side
- Easy example: item price in hidden field

Direct object references

- Seems convenient: query parameter names resource directly
 - E.g., database key, filename (path traversal)
- Easy to forget to validate on each use

Alternative: indirect reference like per-session table Not fundamentally more secure, but harder to forget check

Function-level access control

E.g. pages accessed by URLs or interface buttons
 Must check each time that user is authorized
 Attack: find URL when authorized, reuse when logged off
 Helped by consistent structure in code