


CSci 4271W
 Development of Secure Software Systems
 Day 7: ROP and More Threat Modeling

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Outline

- Return-oriented programming (ROP), cont'd
- ROP shellcoding exercise
- More perspectives on threat modeling
- Threat modeling: printer manager

Pop culture analogy: ransom note trope




Basic new idea

- Treat the stack like a new instruction set
- "Opcodes" are pointers to existing code
- Generalizes return-to-libc with more programmability
- Academic introduction and source of name: Hovav Shacham, ACM CCS 2007


Gadgets

- Basic code unit in ROP
- Any existing instruction sequence that ends in a return
- Found by (possibly automated) search

Another partial example



Overlapping x86 instructions



- Variable length instructions can start at any byte
- Usually only one intended stream

Where gadgets come from

- Possibilities:
 - Entirely intended instructions
 - Entirely unaligned bytes
 - Fall through from unaligned to intended
- Standard x86 return is only one byte, 0xc3

Building instructions

- String together gadgets into manageable units of functionality
- Examples:
 - Loads and stores
 - Arithmetic
 - Unconditional jumps
- Must work around limitations of available gadgets

Hardest case: conditional branch

- Existing jCC instructions not useful
- But carry flag CF is
- Three steps:
 1. Do operation that sets CF
 2. Transfer CF to general-purpose register
 3. Add variable amount to `%esp`

Further advances in ROP

- Can also use other indirect jumps, overlapping not required
- Automation in gadget finding and compilers
- In practice: minimal ROP code to allow transfer to other shellcode

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Threat modeling: printer manager

Setup

- Key motivation for ROP is to disable $W \oplus X$
- Can be done with a single syscall, similar to `execve` shellcode
- Your exercise for today: put together such shellcode from a limited gadget set
- Puzzle/planning aspect: order to avoid overwriting

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Software-oriented modeling

- This is what we've concentrated on until now
 - And it will still be the biggest focus
- Think about attacks based on where they show up in the software
- Benefit: easy to connect to software-level mitigations and fixes

Asset-oriented modeling

- Think about threats based on what assets are targeted / must be protected
- Useful from two perspectives:
 - Predict attacker behavior based on goals
 - Prioritize defense based on potential losses
- Can put other modeling in context, but doesn't directly give you threats

Kinds of assets

- Three overlapping categories:
 - Things attackers want for themselves
 - Things you want to protect
 - Stepping stones to the above

Attacker-oriented modeling

- Think about threats based on the attacker carrying them out
 - Predict attacker behavior based on characteristics
 - Prioritize defense based on likelihood of attack
- Limitation: it can be hard to understand attacker motivations and strategies
 - Be careful about negative claims

Kinds of attackers (Intel TARA)

- | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------|
| ■ Competitor | ■ Terrorist |
| ■ Data miner | ■ Anarchist |
| ■ Radical activist | ■ Irrational individual |
| ■ Cyber vandal | ■ Gov't cyber warrior |
| ■ Sensationalist | ■ Corrupt gov't official |
| ■ Civil activist | ■ Legal adversary |

Kinds of attackers (cont'd)

- Internal spy
- Government spy
- Thief
- Vendor
- Reckless employee
- Information partner
- Disgruntled employee

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Threat modeling: printer manager

Setting: shared lab with printer

- Imagine a scenario similar to CSE Labs
 - Computer labs used by many people, with administrators
- Target for modeling: software system used to manage printing
 - Similar to real system, but use your imagination for unknown details

Example functionality

- Queue of jobs waiting to print
 - Can cancel own jobs, admins can cancel any
- Automatically converting documents to format needed by printer
- Quota of how much you can print

Things to model

- Draw architecture with data flows and trust boundaries
- List assets and attackers
- What are the threats a system must block?