CSci 4271W
Development of Secure Software Systems
Day 7: More Threat Modeling, maybe ROP

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Outline

More perspectives on threat modeling

Announcements intermission

Threat modeling: printer manager

Return-oriented programming (ROP)

Software-oriented modeling

- This is what we've concentrated on until now
  - And it will still be the biggest focus
- Think about attacks based on where they show up in the software
- Benefit: easy to connect to software-level mitigations and fixes

Asset-oriented modeling

- Think about threats based on what assets are targeted / must be protected
- Useful from two perspectives:
  - Predict attacker behavior based on goals
  - Prioritize defense based on potential losses
- Can put other modeling in context, but doesn't directly give you threats

Kinds of assets

- Three overlapping categories:
  - Things attackers want for themselves
  - Things you want to protect
  - Stepping stones to the above

Attacker-oriented modeling

- Think about threats based on the attacker carrying them out
  - Predict attacker behavior based on characteristics
  - Prioritize defense based on likelihood of attack
- Limitation: it can be hard to understand attacker motivations and strategies
  - Be careful about negative claims

Kinds of attackers (Intel TARA)

- Competitor
- Data miner
- Radical activist
- Cyber vandal
- Sensationalist
- Civil activist
- Terrorist
- Anarchist
- Irrational individual
- Gov't cyber warrior
- Corrupt gov't official
- Legal adversary

Kinds of attackers (cont'd)

- Internal spy
- Government spy
- Thief
- Vendor
- Reckless employee
- Information partner
- Disgruntled employee

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Problem Set 1 updates

- Remember, due this Friday 9/29 by 11:59pm
- PDF instructions updated Monday, recheck due date
- Submit PDF on Gradescope, linked from Canvas
- Use Piazza for clarifications, one post there already

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Setting: shared lab with printer

- Imagine a scenario similar to CSE Labs
  - Computer labs used by many people, with administrators
- Target for modeling: software system used to manage printing
  - Similar to real system, but use your imagination for unknown details

Example functionality

- Queue of jobs waiting to print
  - Can cancel own jobs, admins can cancel any
- Automatically converting documents to format needed by printer
- Quota of how much you can print

Assets and attackers

- What assets is the system protecting?
  - What negative consequences do we want to avoid?
- Who are the relevant attackers?
  - What goals motivate those attackers?
- Take 5 minutes to brainstorm with your neighbors

Assets and attackers

- Administrators:
  - Want to let students do printing needed for classes
  - While minimizing spending on paper, toner, and admins responding to problems
- Attackers:
  - Non-students might try to print
  - Students might try to print too much
  - Students might interfere with each other

Data flow diagram

- Show structure of users, software/hardware components, data flows, and trust boundaries
- For this exercise, can mix software, OS, and network perspectives
- Include details relevant to security design decisions
- Take 15 minutes to draw with your neighbors

Data flow diagram: key



DFD #1: access control



- The absence of data flow will need an implementation

DFD #2: optional processing



- Text-to-PDF can't add much risk here

DFD #3: a trust boundary



- Different risks from where authentication lies

STRIDE threat brainstorming

- Think about possible threats using the STRIDE classification
- Are all six types applicable in this example?
- Take 10 minutes to brainstorm with your neighbors

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Counterattack: code reuse

- Attacker can't execute new code
- So, take advantage of instructions already in binary
- There are usually a lot of them
- And no need to obey original structure

Classic return-to-libc (1997)

- Overwrite stack with copies of:
  - Pointer to libc's `system` function
  - Pointer to `"/bin/sh"` string (also in libc)
- The `system` function is especially convenient
- Distinctive feature: return to entry point

Chained return-to-libc

- Shellcode often wants a sequence of actions, e.g.
  - Restore privileges
  - Allow execution of memory area
  - Overwrite system file, etc.
- Can put multiple fake frames on the stack
  - Basic idea present in 1997, further refinements

Pop culture analogy: ransom note trope



Basic new idea

- Treat the stack like a new instruction set
- "Opcodes" are pointers to existing code
- Generalizes return-to-libc with more programmability
- Academic introduction and source of name: Hovav Shacham, ACM CCS 2007

ret2pop (Nergal, Müller)

- Take advantage of shellcode pointer already present on stack
- Rewrite intervening stack to treat the shellcode pointer like a return address
  - A long sequence of chained returns, one pop

ret2pop (Nergal, Müller)



Gadgets

- Basic code unit in ROP
- Any existing instruction sequence that ends in a return
- Found by (possibly automated) search

Another partial example



Overlapping x86 instructions



- Variable length instructions can start at any byte
- Usually only one intended stream

Where gadgets come from

- Possibilities:
  - Entirely intended instructions
  - Entirely unaligned bytes
  - Fall through from unaligned to intended
- Standard x86 return is only one byte, 0xc3

Building instructions

- String together gadgets into manageable units of functionality
- Examples:
  - Loads and stores
  - Arithmetic
  - Unconditional jumps
- Must work around limitations of available gadgets

Hardest case: conditional branch

- Existing jCC instructions not useful
- But carry flag CF is
- Three steps:
  1. Do operation that sets CF
  2. Transfer CF to general-purpose register
  3. Add variable amount to `%esp`

Further advances in ROP

- Can also use other indirect jumps, overlapping not required
- Automation in gadget finding and compilers
- In practice: minimal ROP code to allow transfer to other shellcode