Integer overflow discussion

- Input is first parsed with `strtol` as 64-bit signed integer; overflow clamped and ignored.
- Then copied to signed int:
  - Throw away top bits, reinterpret sign bit.
- But any 32-bit int value can be produced by a program input.

Loop bound

- Read loop is:
  ```c
  for (int i = 0; i < num_objs; i++)
  ```
- `num_objs` negative or zero will read nothing at all.

Overflow in multiplication

- Struct size is 24 bytes, or 11000 (16+8) in binary.
- `24*x == (x << 4) + (x << 3)`
- Top three bits fall off.
- Interpreted as unsigned after multiplication, and by `malloc`.

Vulnerability condition

- Overflow happens if we write more than we allocated.
- Allocation won’t fail on this 64-bit machine (4GB available).
- `24 \cdot \max(x, 0) > (24 \cdot x) \mod 2^{32}`
- Safe if:
  - Count interpreted as negative
  - Overflow does not occur
- Unsafe if `num_objs \geq 0x10000000`

Vulnerability condition

Auditing is...

- Reading code to find security bugs
- Threat modeling comes first, tells you what kinds of bugs you’re looking for
- Bug fixing comes next (might be someone else’s job)
**Tiers and triage**
- You might not have time to do a complete job, so use auditing time strategically
- Which bugs are most likely, and easiest to find?
- Triage into definitely safe, definitively unsafe, hard to tell
  - "Hard to tell" might be improved, even if safe

**Threat model and taint**
- Vulnerability depends on what an attacker might control
- Another word for attacker-controlled is “tainted”
- Threat model is the best source of tainting information
  - Of course, can always be conservative

**Where to look for problems**
- If you can't read all the code carefully, search for indicators of common danger spots
  - For format strings, look for `printf`
  - For buffer overflows, look at buffers and copying functions

**Ideal: proof**
- Given enough time, for each dangerous spot, be able to convince someone:
  - Proof of safety: reasons why a bug could never happen, could turn into assertions
  - Proof of vulnerability: example of tainted input that causes a crash

**Auditing exercise**
- BCLPR is a buggy program from a previous year’s 5271
- This code has at least three buffer overflow bugs: where are they?
- Are all the bugs exploitable? As an attacker, could you use them?
http://www-users.cselabs.umn.edu/classes/Spring-2021/csci4271/slides/02/bclpr.c

**Outline**
- Integer overflow discussion
- Code auditing
- Threat modeling

**Why threat modeling?**
- Think about and describe the security design of your system
- Enumerate possible threats
- Guide effort spent on combating threats
- Communicate to customers and other developers

**Why a structured approach?**
- Goal is to avoid missing a threat
- Enumerate vectors for threats
- Enumerate kinds of threats per vector
- Convince readers of the model's completeness
Data-flow modeling

- Break down software into smaller modules
  - Modules drawn with rounded rectangles
  - More detail is better, within reason
- Show data flows among modules and external parties
  - Rectangles for external parties
  - Most data flows will be bi-directional

Data flow example

Trust boundaries

- A trust boundary groups components with the same privilege, which therefore trust each other
  - Drawn as labeled dotted box
  - Attacks usually don’t originate within a trust group
- The boundary also corresponds to an attack surface

Trust boundaries example

Attacks come with data flows

- Principle: attacks propagate along data flows
- Therefore, enumerate flows to enumerate attacks
  - A more specific prompt, but does not eliminate the need for imagination
  - Other half is types of attacks, see next slide

STRIDE threat taxonomy

- Spoofing (vs authentication)
- Tampering (vs integrity)
- Repudiation (vs. non-repudiation)
- Information disclosure (vs. confidentiality)
- Denial of service (vs. availability)
- Elevation of privilege (vs. authorization)

What to do about threats

- Mitigate: add a defense, which may not be complete
- Eliminate: such as by removing functionality
- Transfer functionality: let someone else handle it
- Transfer risk: convince another to bear the cost
- Accept risk: decide that the risk (probability • loss) is sufficiently low

Spoofing threat examples

- Using someone else’s account
- Making a program use the wrong file
- False address on network traffic
Tampering threat examples
- Modifying an important file
- Rearranging directory structure
- Changing contents of network packets

Repudiation threat examples
- Performing an important action without logging
- Destroying existing logs
- Add fake events to make real events hard to find or not credible

Info. disclosure threat examples
- Eavesdropping on network traffic
- Reading sensitive files
- Learning sensitive information from meta-data

DoS threat examples
- Flood network link with bogus traffic
- Make a server use up available memory
- Make many well-formed but non-productive interactions

Elevation of privilege threat examples
- Cause data to be interpreted as code
- Change process to run as root/administrator
- Convince privileged process to run attacker’s code