#### CSci 427IW Development of Secure Software Systems Day 4: Auditing and Threat Modeling 1

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## Outline

Code auditing

Integer overflow discussion

Threat modeling

## Auditing is...

#### Reading code to find security bugs

- Threat modeling comes first, tells you what kinds of bugs you're looking for
- Bug fixing comes next (might be someone else's job)

## Tiers and triage

- You might not have time to do a complete job, so use auditing time strategically
- Mhich bugs are most likely, and easiest to find?
- Triage into definitely safe, definitively unsafe, hard to tell
  - Hard to tell might be improved even if safe

# Threat model and taint

- Vulnerability depends on what an attacker might control
- Another word for attacker-controlled is "tainted"
- Threat model is the best source of tainting information
  - Of course, can always be conservative

# Where to look for problems

- If you can't read all the code carefully, search for indicators of common danger spots
  - For format strings, look for printf
  - For buffer overflows, look at buffers and copying functions

# Ideal: proof Given enough time, for each dangerous spot, be able to convince someone: Proof of safety: reasons why a bug could never happen, could turn into assertions Proof of vulnerability: example of tainted input that causes a crash

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Threat modeling

#### Integer overflow to buffer overflow

- One common pattern: overflow causes an allocation to be too small
- In machine integers, multiplication doesn't always make a value larger


#### Overflow example


```
struct obj { short ident, x, y, z; long b; double c;};
struct obj *read_objs(int num_objs) {
    unsigned int size = num_objs*(unsigned)sizeof(obj);
    struct obj *objs = malloc(size);
    struct obj *p = objs;
    for (i = 0; i < num_objs; i++) {
        fread(p, sizeof(struct obj), 1, stdin);
        if (p->ident == 0x4442) return 0;
        /* ... */ p++; }
    return objs; }
```


#### Overflow example questions

- 1. What's a value of  $\mathtt{num\_objs}$  that would trigger an overflow?
  - Think back to 2021 on how multiplication overflows
- 2. Why is the p->ident check relevant to exploitability?

http://www-users.cselabs.umn.edu/classes/Spring-2023/ csci4271/slides/02/overflow-eg.c









#### Computing overflow values


- One approach: input must be bigger than 2<sup>32</sup>/24 to overflow
- No-calculator approach: pick numbers where multiplication is easy
  - **Sompare in decimal:**  $1001 \cdot 42 = 42042$





- Goal is to avoid missing a threat
- Enumerate vectors for threats
- Enumerate kinds of threats per vector
- Convince readers of the model's completeness



- parties Rectangles for external parties
  - Most data flows will be bi-drectional









## What to do about threats

- Mitigate: add a defense, which may not be complete
- Eliminate: such as by removing functionality
- Transfer functionality: let someone else handle it
- Transfer risk: convince another to bear the cost
- Accept risk: decide that the risk (probability · loss) is sufficiently low



## Repudiation threat examples

- Performing an important action without logging
- 🖲 Destroying existing logs
- Add fake events to make real events hard to find or not credible

## Info. disclosure threat examples

- Eavesdropping on network traffic
- 🖲 Reading sensitive files
- Learning sensitive information from meta-data

#### DoS threat examples

- Flood network link with bogus traffic
- Make a server use up available memory
- Make many well-formed but non-productive interactions

## Elevation of privilege threat examples

- Cause data to be interpreted as code
- Change process to run as root/administrator
- Convince privileged process to run attacker's code