CSci 4271W Development of Secure Software Systems Day 24: Protocols in practice

Stephen McCamant University of Minnesota, Computer Science & Engineering

Outline

Cryptographic protocols, cont'd Key distribution and PKI Announcements intermission SSH SSL/TLS More causes of crypto failure

Anti-pattern: "oracle"

- Any way a legitimate protocol service can give a capability to an adversary
- Can exist whenever a party decrypts, signs, etc.
- "Padding oracle" was an instance of this at the implementation level

Outline


Cryptographic protocols, cont'd Key distribution and PKI Announcements intermission SSH SSL/TLS More causes of crypto failure

Public key authenticity

- Public keys don't need to be secret, but they must be right
- **(**) Wrong key \rightarrow can't stop middleperson
- So we still have a pretty hard distribution problem

Symmetric key servers

- Users share keys with server, server distributes session keys
- Symmetric key-exchange protocols, or channels
- 🖲 Standard: Kerberos
- Drawback: central point of trust



Web of trust

Pioneered in PGP for email encryption
 Everyone is potentially a CA: trust people you know
 Works best with security-motivated users

 Ever attended a key signing party?

CA hierarchies

- 🖲 Organize CAs in a tree
- Distributed, but centralized (like DNS)
- Check by follow a path to the root
- Best practice: sub CAs are limited in what they certify

PKI for authorization

Enterprise PKI can link up with permissions

- One approach: PKI maps key to name, ACL maps name to permissions
- Often better: link key with permissions directly, name is a comment

The revocation problem

- How can we make certs "go away" when needed?
- Impossible without being online somehow
- 1. Short expiration times
- 2. Certificate revocation lists
- 3. Certificate status checking

Outline Project 1 status Cryptographic protocols, cont/d Key distribution and PKI Announcements intermission SSH SSL/TLS More causes of crypto failure We've reduced the required number of vulnerabilities to 2 Extra credit available for 3 or more Regular due date is still Monday night Please continue non-spoiler public discussions on Piazza

Outline

Cryptographic protocols, cont'd Key distribution and PKI Announcements intermission SSH SSL/TLS More causes of crypto failure

Short history of SSH

- Started out as freeware by Tatu Ylönen in 1995
- Original version commercialized
- Fully open-source OpenSSH from OpenBSD
- Protocol redesigned and standardized for "SSH 2"



SSH host keys

Every SSH server has a public/private keypair
 Ideally, never changes once SSH is installed
 Early generation a classic entropy problem
 Especially embedded systems, VMs

Authentication methods

Password, encrypted over channel

🖲 .shosts: like .rhosts, but using client host key

🖲 User-specific keypair

Public half on server, private on client

Plugins for Kerberos, PAM modules, etc.

Old crypto vulnerabilities

- 1.x had only CRC for integrity
 Worst case: when used with RC4
- Injection attacks still possible with CBC CRC compensation attack
- For least-insecure 1.x-compatibility, attack detector
- Alas, detector had integer overflow worse than original attack

Newer crypto vulnerabilities

IV chaining: IV based on last message ciphertext

- Allows chosen plaintext attacks
- Better proposal: separate, random IVs
- 🖲 Some tricky attacks still left
 - Send byte-by-byte, watch for errors
 - Of arguable exploitability due to abort
- Now migrating to CTR mode

SSH over SSH

- SSH to machine 1, from there to machine 2 Common in these days of NATs
- Better: have machine 1 forward an encrypted connection
- 1. No need to trust 1 for secrecy
- 2. Timing attacks against password typing

SSH (non-)PKI


When you connect to a host freshly, a mild note
When the host key has changed, a large warning


eccesses and the state of the s

It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.

Outline

Cryptographic protocols, cont'd Key distribution and PKI Announcements intermission SSH SSL/TLS More causes of crypto failure





"BEAST" automated attack in 2011: TLS 1.1 wakeup call

Compression oracle vuln.

- O Compr(S \parallel A), where S should be secret and A is attacker-controlled
- Attacker observes ciphertext length
- If A is similar to S, combination compresses better
- Compression exists separately in HTTP and TLS

But wait, there's more!

- Too many vulnerabilities to mention them all in lecture
- Kaloper-Meršinjak et al. have longer list "Lessons learned" are variable, though
- Meta-message: don't try this at home

HTTPS hierarchical PKI

Browser has order of 100 root certs


- Not same set in every browser
- Standards for selection not always clear
- Many of these in turn have sub-CAs
- 🖲 Also, "wildcard" certs for individual domains

Hierarchical trust?


- 🖲 No. Any CA can sign a cert for any domain
- A couple of CA compromises recently
- Most major governments, and many companies you've never heard of, could probably make a google.com cert
- Still working on: make browser more picky, compare notes

CA vs. leaf checking bug

- Certs have a bit that says if they're a CA
- All but last entry in chain should have it set
- Browser authors repeatedly fail to check this bit
- Allows any cert to sign any other cert



MD5 certificate collisions



HTTPS and usability

- Many HTTPS security challenges tied with user decisions
- Is this really my bank?
- Seems to be a quite tricky problem Security warnings often ignored, etc.

Outline

Cryptographic protocols, cont'd

Key distribution and PKI

Announcements intermission

SSH

SSL/TLS

More causes of crypto failure

Random numbers and entropy

- Cryptographic RNGs use cipher-like techniques to provide indistinguishability
- But rely on truly random seeding to stop brute force Extreme case: no entropy — always same "randomness"
- Modern best practice: seed pool with 256 bits of entropy
 - Suitable for security levels up to 2²⁵⁶

Netscape RNG failure

- Early versions of Netscape SSL (1994-1995) seeded with:
 - Time of day
 - Process ID
 - Parent process ID
- Best case entropy only 64 bits
 - (Not out of step with using 40-bit encryption)
- But worse because many bits guessable

Debian/OpenSSL RNG failure (1)


- OpenSSL has pretty good scheme using /dev/urandom
- Also mixed in some uninitialized variable values "Extra variation can't hurt"
- From modern perspective, this was the original sin Remember undefined behavior discussion?
- But had no immediate ill effects

Debian/OpenSSL RNG failure (2) Debian maintainer commented out some lines to fix a Valgrind warning "Potential use of uninitialized value"

- Accidentally disabled most entropy (all but 16 bits)
- Brief mailing list discussion didn't lead to understanding
- Broken library used for ~2 years before discovery

Detected RSA/DSA collisions

- 2012: around 1% of the SSL keys on the public net are breakable
 - Some sites share complete keypairs
 - RSA keys with one prime in common (detected by large-scale GCD)
- One likely culprit: insufficient entropy in key generation
 - Embedded devices, Linux /dev/urandom vs. /dev/random
- DSA signature algorithm also very vulnerable



WEP "privacy"

- First WiFi encryption standard: Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
- F&S: designed by a committee that contained no cryptographers
- Problem 1: note "privacy": what about integrity? Nope: stream cipher + CRC = easy bit flipping

WEP shared key

Single key known by all parties on network

- 🖲 Easy to compromise
- 🖲 Hard to change
- Also often disabled by default
- 🖲 Example: a previous employer

WEP key size and IV size

Original sizes: 40-bit shared key (export restrictions) plus 24-bit IV = 64-bit RC4 key
Both too small

- 🖲 128-bit upgrade kept 24-bit IV
 - Vague about how to choose IVs
 - Least bad: sequential, collision takes hours
 - Worse: random or everyone starts at zero

WEP RC4 related key attacks

Only true crypto weakness

- RC4 "key schedule" vulnerable when:
 - RC4 keys very similar (e.g., same key, similar IV)
 - First stream bytes used
- Not such a problem for other RC4 users like SSL Key from a hash, skip first output bytes

New problem with WPA (CCS'17)

🖲 Session key set up in a 4-message handshake

- Key reinstallation attack: replay #3
 - Causes most implementations to reset nonce and replay counter
 - In turn allowing many other attacks
 - One especially bad case: reset key to 0
- Protocol state machine behavior poorly described in spec
 - Outside the scope of previous security proofs

Trustworthiness of primitives

- Classic worry: DES S-boxes
- Obviously in trouble if cipher chosen by your adversary
- In a public spec, most worrying are unexplained elements
- Best practice: choose constants from well-known math, like digits of π

Dual_EC_DRBG (1)

- Pseudorandom generator in NIST standard, based on elliptic curve
- Looks like provable (slow enough!) but strangely no proof
- Specification includes long unexplained constants
- Academic researchers find:
 - Some EC parts look good
 - But outputs are statistically distinguishable

Dual_EC_DRBG (2) Found 2007: special choice of constants allows prediction attacks Big red flag for paranoid academics Significant adoption in products sold to US govt. FIPS-140 standards Semi-plausible rationale from RSA (EMC) NSA scenario basically confirmed by Snowden leaks NIST and RSA immediately recommend withdrawal