### CSci 5271 Introduction to Computer Security Day 10: OS security: access control

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### Authentication factors

Something you know (password, PIN)

- Something you have (e.g., smart card)
- Something you are (biometrics)
- CAPTCHAs, time and location, ....
- 🖲 Multi-factor authentication

### Outline

OS security: authentication Basics of access control Unix-style access control Announcements intermission Multilevel and mandatory access control Capability-based access control

### Passwords: love to hate

Many problems for users, sysadmins, researchers
 But familiar and near-zero cost of entry
 User-chosen passwords proliferate for low-stakes

web site authentication

### Password entropy

Model password choice as probabilistic process

If uniform, log<sub>2</sub> |S|

- Controls difficulty of guessing attacks
- Hard to estimate for user-chosen passwords Length is an imperfect proxy

### Password hashing

- Idea: don't store password or equivalent information
- Password 'encryption' is a long-standing misnomer E.g., Unix crypt(3)
- Presumably hard-to-invert function h
- **Store only** h(p)

### Dictionary attacks

- Online: send guesses to server
- Offline: attacker can check guesses internally
- Specialized password lists more effective than literal dictionaries

 $\blacksquare$  Also generation algorithms (s  $\rightarrow$  \$, etc.)

~25% of passwords consistently vulnerable

### Better password hashing

**Output** Generate random salt s, store (s, h(s, p))

- Block pre-computed tables and equality inferences
  - Salt must also have enough entropy
- Deliberately expensive hash function
  - AKA password-based key derivation function (PBKDF)
  - Requirement for time and/or space


### Password usability User compliance can be a major challenge Often caused by unrealistic demands Distributed random passwords usually unrealistic Password aging: not too frequently Never have a fixed default password in a product

### Backup authentication

- Desire: unassisted recovery from forgotten password
- Fall back to other presumed-authentic channel Email, cell phone
- Harder to forget (but less secret) shared information
   Mother's maiden name, first pet's name
- 🖲 Brittle: ask Sarah Palin or Mat Honan


# Centralized authenticationBiometric authentication Enterprise-wide (e.g., UMN ID) Anderson: Microsoft Passport Today: Facebook Connect, Google ID May or may not be single-sign-on (SSO) May or may not be single-sign-on (SSO) SO) Hard to reset Inherently statistical Variation among people





### Access control matrix

		grades.txt	/dev/hda	/usr/bin/bcvi
	Alice	r	rw	rx
	Bob	rw	-	rx
	Carol	r	-	rx



### Groups/roles

Simplify by factoring out commonality

- Before: users have permissions
- After: users have roles, roles have permissions
- 🖲 Simple example: Unix groups
- Complex versions called role-based access control (RBAC)



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
Capability-based access control

### **UIDs and GIDs**

- To kernel, users and groups are just numeric identifiers
- Names are a user-space nicety
  - 🖲 E.g., /etc/passwd mapping
- 🖲 Historically 16-bit, now 32
- User O is the special superuser root
  - Exempt from all access control checks

### File mode bits

- Core permissions are 9 bits, three groups of three
- Read, write, execute for user, group, other
- 🗐 ls format: rwx r-x r--
- 🖲 Octal format: 0754





- Same bits, slightly different interpretation
- 🖲 Read: list contents (e.g., 1s)
- 🖲 Write: add or delete files
- 🖲 Execute: traverse
- X but not R means: have to know the names

### Process UIDs and setuid(2)

- UID is inherited by child processes, and an unprivileged process can't change it
- But there are syscalls root can use to change the UID, starting with setuid
- 🖲 E.g., login program, SSH server

### Setuid programs, different UIDs

- If 04000 "setuid" bit set, newly exec'd process will take UID of its file owner
  - Other side conditions, like process not traced
- Specifically the effective UID is changed, while the real UID is unchanged
  - Shows who called you, allows switching back


## More different UIDs Setgid, games Two mechanisms for temporary switching: Swap real UID and effective UID (BSD) Remember saved UID, allow switching to it (System V) Modern systems support both mechanisms at the same time Linux only: *file-system UID* Once used for NFS servers, now mostly obsolete Setgid bit 02000 mostly analogous to setuid But note no supergroup, so UID 0 is still special Classic application: setgid games for managing high-score files


### Special case: /tmp

We'd like to allow anyone to make files in /tmp
So, everyone should have write permission
But don't want Alice deleting Bob's files
Solution: "sticky bit" 01000

### Special case: group inheritance

- When using group to manage permissions, want a whole tree to have a single group
- When 02000 bit set, newly created entries with have the parent's group (Historic BSD behavior)
- Also, directories will themselves inherit 02000





### "POSIX" ACLs

Based on a withdrawn standardization
 More flexible permissions, still fairly Unix-like
 Multiple user and group entries

 Decision still based on one entry

 Default ACLs: generalize group inheritance
 Command line: getfacl, setfacl

- ACL legacy interactions
- Hard problem: don't break security of legacy code Suggests: "fail closed"
- Contrary pressure: don't want to break functionality Suggests: "fail open"
- POSIX ACL design: old group permission bits are a mask on all novel permissions

### "POSIX" "capabilities"

- Divide root privilege into smaller (~35) pieces
- Note: not real capabilities
- First runtime only, then added to FS similar to setuid
- Motivating example: ping
- Also allows permanent disabling

### Privilege escalation dangers

Many pieces of the root privilege are enough to regain the whole thing

 Access to files as UID 0
 CAP\_DAC\_OVERRIDE

- CAP\_DAC\_OVERNI CAP\_FOWNER
- CAP\_SYS\_MODULE
- CAP\_MKNOD
- CAP\_PTRACE
- CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN (mount)

### Legacy interaction dangers

Former bug: take away capability to drop privileges
 Use of temporary files by no-longer setuid programs
 For more details: "Exploiting capabilities", Emeric Nasi

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Multilevel and mandatory access control

Capability-based access control

### One-time office hour change

This week only, my (Prof. McCamant's) Zoom-based office hours will be on Thursday from 10-11am.

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
### MAC vs. DAC

### Discretionary access control (DAC)

- Users mostly decide permissions on their own files
- If you have information, you can pass it on to anyone
- E.g., traditional Unix file permissions
- Mandatory access control (MAC)
  - Restrictions enforced regardless of subject choices
  - Typically specified by an administrator

### Motivation: it's classified

- Government defense and intelligence agencies use classification to restrict access to information
- E.g.: Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret
- Multilevel Secure (MLS) systems first developed to support mixing classification levels under timesharing



### Biba and low watermark

- Inverting a confidentiality policy gives an integrity one
- 🖲 Biba: no write up, no read down
- Low watermark policy
- **OBLP**  $\wedge$  Biba  $\Rightarrow$  levels are isolated

### Information-flow perspective


High watermark property


Process has security level equal to highest file read


Dynamic implementation of BLP


Written files inherit this level


- Confidentiality: secret data should not flow to public sinks
- Integrity: untrusted data should not flow to critical sinks
- Watermark policies are process-level conservative abstractions














### Lattice model

- Generalize MLS levels to elements in a lattice
- BLP and Biba work analogously with lattice ordering
- No access to incomparable levels
- Potential problem: combinatorial explosion of compartments







### MLS operating systems

1970s timesharing, including Multics

- "Trusted" versions of commercial Unix (e.g. Solaris)
- SELinux (called "type enforcement")
- Integrity protections in Windows Vista and later

### Multi-VM systems

One (e.g., Windows) VM for each security level

- More trustworthy OS underneath provides limited interaction
- E.g., NSA NetTop: VMWare on SELinux
- 🖲 Downside: administrative overhead

### Air gaps, pumps, and diodes

- The lack of a connection between networks of different levels is called an *air gap*
- A pump transfers data securely from one network to another
- A data diode allows information flow in only one direction

### Chelsea Manning cables leak

- Manning (née Bradley) was an intelligence analyst deployed to Iraq
- PC in a T-SCIF connected to SIPRNet (Secret), air gapped
- CD-RWs used for backup and software transfer
- Contrary to policy: taking such a CD-RW home in your pocket http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/022813-statement.pdf

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Unix-style access control

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### ACLs: no fine-grained subjects

- Subjects are a list of usernames maintained by a sysadmin
- Unusual to have a separate subject for an application
- Cannot easily subset access (sandbox)

### ACLs: ambient authority

All authority exists by virtue of identity

Kernel automatically applies all available authority

Authority applied incorrectly leads to attacks

### Confused deputy problem

- Compiler writes to billing database
- Compiler can produce debug output to user-specified file
- Specify debug output to billing file, disrupt billing

### (Object) capabilities

A capability both designates a resource and provides authority to access it
 Similar to an object reference

 Unforgeable, but can copy and distribute

 Typically still managed by the kernel

### Capability slogans (Miller et al.)

- No designation without authority
- Dynamic subject creation
- Subject-aggregated authority mgmt.
- 🖲 No ambient authority
- Composability of authorities
- Access-controlled delegation
- Dynamic resource creation

### Partial example: Unix FDs

Authority to access a specific file

- Managed by kernel on behalf of process
- Can be passed between processes
  - Though rare other than parent to child
- Unix not designed to use pervasively

### Distinguish: password capabilities

- Bit pattern itself is the capability
   No centralized management
- Modern example: authorization using cryptographic certificates

### **Revocation with capabilities**

- Use indirection: give real capability via a pair of middlemen
- ${\color{black} \bullet} A \to B \text{ via } A \to F \to R \to B$
- Retain capability to tell R to drop capability to B
- Depends on composability

### Confinement with capabilities

- A cannot pass a capability to B if it cannot communicate with A at all
- Disconnected parts of the capability graph cannot be reconnected
- Depends on controlled delegation and data/capability distinction

### OKL4 and seL4

- Commercial and research microkernels
- Recent versions of OKL4 use capability design from seL4
- Used as a hypervisor, e.g. underneath paravirtualized Linux
- Shipped on over 1 billion cell phones

### Joe-E and Caja

- Dialects of Java and JavaScript (resp.) using capabilities for confined execution
- E.g., of JavaScript in an advertisement
- Note reliance on Java and JavaScript type safety



Techniques for higher assurance