#### CSci 4271W Development of Secure Software Systems Day 14: OS Attacks and Protection

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## Outline

Shell code injection related threats, cont'd Race conditions and related threats Announcements intermission Good technical writing

Secure OS interaction

# Different shells and multiple interpretation

- Complex Unix systems include shells at multiple levels, making these issues more complex
  - Frequent example: scp runs a shell on the server, so filenames with whitespace need double escaping
- Other shell-like programs also have caveats with levels of interpretation
  - Tcl before version 9 interpreted leading zeros as octal

# **Related local dangers**

- File names might contain any character except / or the null character
- The PATH environment variable is user-controllable, so cp may not be the program you expect
- Environment variables controlling the dynamic loader cause other code to be loaded

# IFS and why it was a problem

- In Unix, splitting a command line into words is the shell's job
  - lacksquare String ightarrow argy array
  - ∎grep a b c **vs**.grep 'a b' c
- Choice of separator characters (default space, tab, newline) is configurable
- Exploit system("/bin/uname")
- In modern shells, improved by not taking from environment

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
- Announcements intermission
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#### Bad/missing error handling


- Under what circumstances could each system call fail?
- Careful about rolling back after an error in the middle of a complex operation
- **E** Fail to drop privileges  $\Rightarrow$  run untrusted code anyway
- **Outputs** file when disk full  $\Rightarrow$  truncate

# **Race conditions**

- Two actions in parallel; result depends on which happens first
- Usually attacker racing with you
- 1. Write secret data to file
- 2. Restrict read permissions on file
- Many other examples



# TOCTTOU gaps



# Read It Twice (WOOT'12)

- Smart TV (running Linux) only accepts signed apps on USB sticks
- 1. Check signature on file
- 2. Install file
- Malicious USB device replaces app between steps
- TV "rooted"/"jailbroken"

# TOCTTOU example

```
int safe_open_file(char *path) {
    int fd = -1;
    struct stat s;
    stat(path, &s)
    if (!S_ISREG(s.st_mode))
      error("only regular files allowed");
    else fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
    return fd;
}
```

## TOCTTOU example

```
int safe_open_file(char *path) {
    int fd = -1, res;
    struct stat s;
    res = stat(path, &s)
    if (res || !S_ISREG(s.st_mode))
        error("only regular files allowed");
    else fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
    return fd;
}
```

#### TOCTTOU example

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## Changing file references

- With symbolic links
- 🖲 With hard links
- With changing parent directories

#### Directory traversal with . .

- Program argument specifies file, found in directory files
- What about files/../../../etc/passwd?

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# First reading assignment posted

- The external reading on today's topics is chapters from a web-hosted book by David A. Wheeler
- 5 multiple-choice reading questions are a repeatable auto-graded Canvas quiz, due by a week from today, Thursday 10/26.

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# Writing in CS versus other writing

- Key goal is accurately conveying precise technical information
- More important: careful use of terminology, structured organization
- Less important: writer's personality, persuasion, appeals to emotion

#### Still important: concise expression

Don't use long words or complicated expressions when simpler ones would convey the same meaning. Negative examples:

🖲 necessitate

- 🖲 utilize
- due to the fact that
- Beneficial for both clarity and style

## Know your audience: terminology

- When technical terminology makes your point clearly, use it
- Provide definitions if a concept might be new to many readers
  - Be careful to provide the right information in the definition
     Define at the first instead of a later use
- But, avoid introducing too many new terms
   Keep the same term when referring to the same concept

# Precise explanations Don't say "we" do something when it's the computer that does it

And avoid passive constructions

- Don't anthropomorphize (computers don't "know")
- Use singular by default so plural provides a distinction:
  - The students take tests
  - + Each student takes a test
  - + Each student takes two tests

# Provide structure

- Use plenty of sections and sub-sections
- It's OK to have some redundancy in previewing structure
- Limit each paragraph to one concept, and not too long
  - Start with a clear topic sentence
- Split long, complex sentences into separate ones

# Know your audience: Project 0.5

For projects in this course, assume your audience is another student who already understands general course concepts

- Up to the current point in the course
- le, don't need to define "buffer overflow" from scratch
- But you need to explain specifics of a vulnerable program
  - Make clear what part of the program you're referring to
  - Explain all the specific details of a vulnerability

## Inclusive language

- Avoid words and grammar that implies relevant people are male
- My opinion: avoid using he/him pronouns for unknown people
- Some possible alternatives
  - "he/she"
  - Alternating genders
  - Rewrite to plural and use "they" (may be less clear)
  - Singular "they" (least traditional, but spreading)

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# Avoid special privileges

- Require users to have appropriate permissions
   Rather than putting trust in programs
- 🖲 Dangerous pattern 1: setuid/setgid program
- Dangerous pattern 2: privileged daemon
- But, sometimes unavoidable (e.g., email)

# Prefer file descriptors

- Maintain references to files by keeping them open and using file descriptors, rather than by name
- References same contents despite file system changes
- Use openat, etc., variants to use FD instead of directory paths

# Prefer absolute paths


- Use full paths (starting with /) for programs and files
- 5 PATH under local user control
- Initial working directory under local user control
   But FD-like, so can be used in place of openat if missing

## Prefer fully trusted paths

- Each directory component in a path must be write protected
- Read-only file in read-only directory can be changed if a parent directory is modified

# Don't separate check from use

- Avoid pattern of e.g., access then open Instead, just handle failure of open
- You have to do this anyway
- Multiple references allow races
  - And access also has a history of bugs



# Give up privileges

- Using appropriate combinations of set\*id functions
  Alas, details differ between Unix variants
- 🖲 Best: give up permanently
- Second best: give up temporarily
- Detailed recommendations: Setuid Demystified (USENIX'02)



- Can change the behavior of called program in unexpected ways
- Decide which ones are necessary As few as possible
- Save these, remove any others

## For more details...


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# OS security topics

- Resource protection
- Process isolation
- User authentication (will cover later)
- Access control (already covered)

# Protection and isolation

- Resource protection: prevent processes from accessing hardware
- Process isolation: prevent processes from interfering with each other
- Design: by default processes can do neither
- Must request access from operating system



- Tamperproof: the monitor is itself protected from modification
- Small enough to be thoroughly verified

## Hardware basis: memory protection

- Historic: segments
- Modern: paging and page protection
  - Memory divided into pages (e.g. 4k)
  - Every process has own virtual to physical page table
  - Pages also have R/W/X permissions

