Relative proofs

- Prove security under an unproved assumption
- In symmetric crypto, prove a construction is secure if the primitive is
  - Often the proof looks like: if the construction is insecure, so is the primitive
- Can also prove immunity against a particular kind of attack

Random oracle paradigm

- Assume ideal model of primitives: functions selected uniformly from a large space
  - Anderson: elves in boxes
- Not theoretically sound; assumption cannot be satisfied
  - But seems to be safe in practice

Pseudorandomness and distinguishers

- Claim: primitive cannot be distinguished from a truly random counterpart
  - In polynomial time with non-negligible probability
- We can build a distinguisher algorithm to exploit any weakness
- Slightly too strong for most practical primitives, but a good goal

Open standards

- How can we get good primitives?
- Open-world best practice: run competition, invite experts to propose then attack
  - Run by neutral experts, e.g. US NIST
- Recent good examples: AES, SHA-3

A certain three-letter agency

- National Security Agency (NSA): has primary responsibility for “signals intelligence”
- Dual-mission tension:
  - Break the encryption of everyone in the world
  - Help US encryption not be broken by foreign powers
Stream ciphers

- Closest computational version of one-time pad
- Key (or seed) used to generate a long pseudorandom bitstream
- Closely related: cryptographic RNG

Shift register stream ciphers

- Linear-feedback shift register (LFSR): easy way to generate long pseudorandom sequence
  - But linearity allows for attack
  - Several ways to add non-linearity
  - Common in constrained hardware, poor security record

RC4

- Fast, simple, widely used software stream cipher
  - Previously a trade secret, also "ARCFOUR"
- Many attacks, none yet fatal to careful users (e.g. TLS)
  - Famous non-careful user: WEP
- Now deprecated, not recommended for new uses

Encryption ≠ integrity

- Encryption protects secrecy, not message integrity
- For constant-size encryption, changing the ciphertext just creates a different plaintext
- How will your system handle that?
- Always need to take care of integrity separately

Stream cipher mutability

- Strong example of encryption vs. integrity
- In stream cipher, flipping a ciphertext bit flips the corresponding plaintext bit, only
- Very convenient for targeted changes

Salsa and ChaCha

- Published by Daniel Bernstein 2007-2008
- Stream cipher with random access to stream
  - Related to counter mode discussed later
- Fast on general-purpose CPUs without specialized hardware
- Adopted as option for TLS and SSH
  - Prominent early adopter: Chrome on Android

Stream cipher assessment

- Currently less fashionable as a primitive in software
- Not inherently insecure
  - Other common pitfall: must not reuse key(stream)

Outline

- Crypto basics, cont'd
- Stream ciphers
- Announcements intermission
- Block ciphers and modes of operation
- Hash functions and MACs
- Building a secure channel
Project 1 related announcements
- Canvas assignment is now open for submissions
  - Extensions implemented as "late", check if you plan to use yours
- I will hold an extra office hour after class (5:30-6:30) tonight

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Basic idea
- Encryption/decryption for a fixed sized block
- Insecure if block size is too small
  - Barely enough: 64 bits; current standard: 128
  - Reversible, so must be one-to-one and onto function

Pseudorandom permutation
- Ideal model: key selects a random invertible function
  - I.e., permutation (PRP) on block space
  - Note: not permutation on bits
- "Strong" PRP: distinguisher can decrypt as well as encrypt

Confusion and diffusion
- Basic design principles articulated by Shannon
  - Confusion: combine elements so none can be analyzed individually
  - Diffusion: spread the effect of one symbol around to others
  - Iterate multiple rounds of transformation

Substitution/permutation network
- Parallel structure combining reversible elements:
  - Substitution: invertible lookup table ("S-box")
  - Permutation: shuffle bits

AES
- Advanced Encryption Standard: NIST contest 2001
  - Developed under the name Rijndael
- 128-bit block, 128/192/256-bit key
- Fast software implementation with lookup tables (or dedicated insns)
- Allowed by US government up to Top Secret

Feistel cipher
- Split block in half, operate in turn:
  \[(L_{i+1}, R_{i+1}) = (R_i, L_i \oplus F(R_i, K_i))\]
- Key advantage: F need not be invertible
  - Also saves space in hardware
- Luby-Rackoff: if F is pseudo-random, 4 or more rounds gives a strong PRP
### DES
- Data Encryption Standard: AES predecessor
  - 1977-2005
- 64-bit block, 56-bit key
- Implementable in 70s hardware, not terribly fast in software
- Triple DES variant still used in places

### Some DES history
- Developed primarily at IBM, based on an earlier cipher named “Lucifer”
- Final spec helped and “helped” by the NSA
  - Argued for smaller key size
  - S-boxes tweaked to avoid a then-secret attack
- Eventually victim to brute-force attack

### DES brute force history
- 1977 est. $20m cost custom hardware
- 1993 est. $1m cost custom hardware
- 1997 distributed software break
- 1998 $250k built ASIC hardware
- 2006 $10k FPGAs
- 2012 as-a-service against MS-CHAPv2

### Double encryption?
- Combine two different block ciphers?
  - Belt and suspenders
  - Anderson: don’t do it
  - FS&K: could do it, not a recommendation
  - Maurer and Massey (J.Crypt’93): might only be as strong as first cipher

### Modes of operation
- How to build a cipher for arbitrary-length data from a block cipher
- Many approaches considered
  - For some reason, most have three-letter acronyms
- More recently: properties susceptible to relative proof

### ECB
- Electronic CodeBook
- Split into blocks, apply cipher to each one individually
-Leaks equalities between plaintext blocks
-Almost never suitable for general use

### Do not use ECB

![Image of a computer screen](image)

### CBC
- Cipher Block Chaining
- $C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$
- Long-time most popular approach, starting to decline
- Plaintext changes propagate forever, ciphertext changes only one block
CBC: getting an IV
- \( C_0 \) is called the initialization vector (IV)
- Must be known for decryption
- IV should be random-looking
  - To prevent first-block equalities from leaking (lesser version of ECB problem)
- Common approaches
  - Generate at random
  - Encrypt a nonce

Stream modes: OFB, CTR
- Output FeedBack: produce keystream by repeatedly encrypting the IV
  - Danger: collisions lead to repeated keystream
- Counter: produce from encryptions of an incrementing value
  - Recently becoming more popular: allows parallelization and random access

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Ideal model
- Ideal crypto hash function: pseudorandom function
  - Arbitrary input, fixed-size output
- Simplest kind of elf in box, theoretically very convenient
- But large gap with real systems: common practice is to target particular properties

Kinds of attacks
- Pre-image, "inversion": given \( y \), find \( x \) such that \( H(x) = y \)
- Second preimage, targeted collision: given \( x \), \( H(x) \), find \( x' \neq x \) such that \( H(x') = H(x) \)
- (Free) collision: find \( x_1, x_2 \) such that \( H(x_1) = H(x_2) \)

Birthday paradox and attack
- There are almost certainly two people in this class with the same birthday
- \( n \) people have \( \binom{n}{2} = \Theta(n^2) \) pairs
- So only about \( \sqrt{n} \) expected for collision
- "Birthday attack" finds collisions in any function

Security levels
- For function with \( k \)-bit output:
  - Preimage and second preimage should have complexity \( 2^k \)
  - Collision has complexity \( 2^{k/2} \)
- Conservative: use hash function twice as big as block cipher key
  - Though if you're paranoid, cipher blocks can repeat too

Non-cryptographic hash functions
- The ones you probably use for hash tables
- CRCs, checksums
- Output too small, but also not resistant to attack
- E.g., CRC is linear and algebraically nice
Short hash function history
- On the way out: MD5 (128 bit)
  - Flaws known, collision-finding now routine
- SHA(-0): first from NIST/NSA, quickly withdrawn
  - Likely flaw discovered 3 years later
- SHA-1: fixed SHA-0, 160-bit output.
  - $2^{60}$ collision attack described in 2013
    - First public collision found (using 6.5 kCPU yr) in 2017

Length extension problem
- MD5, SHA1, etc., computed left to right over blocks
- Can sometimes compute $H(a k b)$ in terms of $H(a)$
  - $k$ means bit string concatenation
- Makes many PRF-style constructions insecure

SHA-2 and SHA-3
- SHA-2: evolutionary, larger, improvement of SHA-1
  - Exists as SHA-224, 256, 384, 512
  - But still has length-extension problem
- SHA-3: chosen recently in open competition like AES
  - Formerly known as Keccak, official standard Aug. 2015
  - New design, fixes length extension
  - Adoption has been gradual

MAC: basic idea
- Message authentication code: similar to hash function, but with a key
- Adversary without key cannot forge MACs
- Strong definition: adversary cannot forge anything, even given chosen-message MACs on other messages

CBC-MAC construction
- Same process as CBC encryption, but:
  - Start with IV of 0
  - Return only the last ciphertext block
- Both these conditions needed for security
- For fixed-length messages (only), as secure as the block cipher

HMAC construction
- $H(K || M)$: insecure due to length extension
  - Still not recommended: $H(M || K)$, $H(K || M || K)$
- HMAC: $H(K \oplus a \parallel H(K \oplus b \parallel M))$
  - Standard $a = 0x5c$*, $b = 0x36$*
  - Probably the most widely used MAC

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Session keys
- Don’t use your long term password, etc., directly as a key
- Instead, session key used for just one channel
- In modern practice, usually obtained with public-key crypto
- Separate keys for encryption and MACing
Order of operations

- Encrypt and MAC ("in parallel")
  - Safe only under extra assumptions on the MAC
- Encrypt then MAC
  - Has cleanest formal safety proof
- MAC then Encrypt
  - Preferred by FS&K for some practical reasons
  - Can also be secure

Authenticated encryption modes

- Encrypting and MACing as separate steps is about twice as expensive as just encrypting
- "Authenticated encryption" modes do both at once
  - Newer (circa 2000) innovation, many variants
  - NIST-standardized and unpatented: Galois Counter Mode (GCM)

Ordering and message numbers

- Also don't want attacker to be able to replay or reorder messages
- Simple approach: prefix each message with counter
- Discard duplicate/out-of-order messages

Padding

- Adjust message size to match multiple of block size
- To be reversible, must sometimes make message longer
  - E.g.: for 16-byte block, append either 1, or 2 2, or 3 3 3, up to 16 "16" bytes

Padding oracle attack

- Have to be careful that decoding of padding does not leak information
- E.g., spend same amount of time MACing and checking padding whether or not padding is right
- Remote timing attack against CBC TLS published 2013

Don't actually reinvent the wheel

- This is all implemented carefully in OpenSSL, SSH, etc.
- Good to understand it, but rarely sensible to reimplement it
- You'll probably miss at least one of decades' worth of attacks