Outline

- ROC curve exercise
- Web authentication, cont'd
- TLS and certificates
- Names and identities
- Usability and security

Error rates: ROC curve

Extreme biometrics examples

- exact_iris_code_match: very low false positive (false authentication)
- similar_voice_pitch: very low false negative (false reject)

Where are these in ROC space?

A if (iris()) return REJECT; else return ACCEPT;
B return REJECT;
C if (iris()) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;
D if (iris() && pitch()) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;
E return ACCEPT;
F if (rand() & 1) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;
G if (pitch()) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;
H if (iris() || pitch()) return ACCEPT; else return REJECT;

Account management

- Limitations on account creation
  - CAPTCHA? Outside email address?
- See previous discussion on hashed password storage
- Automated password recovery
  - Usually a weak spot
  - But, practically required for large system

Client and server checks

- For usability, interface should show what's possible
- But must not rely on client to perform checks
- Attackers can read/modify anything on the client side
- Easy example: item price in hidden field
Direct object references
- Seems convenient: query parameter names resource directly
  - E.g., database key, filename (path traversal)
- Easy to forget to validate on each use
- Alternative: indirect reference like per-session table
  - Not fundamentally more secure, but harder to forget check

Function-level access control
- E.g. pages accessed by URLs or interface buttons
- Must check each time that user is authorized
  - Attack: find URL when authorized, reuse when logged off
- Helped by consistent structure in code

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HTTPS hierarchical PKI
- Browser has order of 100 root certs
  - Not same set in every browser
  - Standards for selection not always clear
- Many of these in turn have sub-CAs
- Also, "wildcard" certs for individual domains

Hierarchical trust?
- No. Any CA can sign a cert for any domain
- A couple of CA compromises recently
- Most major governments, and many companies you’ve never heard of, could probably make a google.com cert
- Still working on: make browser more picky, compare notes

CA validation standards
- CA's job to check if the buyer really is foo.com
- Race to the bottom problem:
  - CA has minimal liability for bad certs
  - Many people want cheap certs
  - Cost of validation cuts out of profit
- "Extended validation" (green bar) certs attempt to fix

HTTPS and usability
- Many HTTPS security challenges tied with user decisions
- Is this really my bank?
- Seems to be a quite tricky problem
  - Security warnings often ignored, etc.

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**Accounts versus identities**
- “Identity” is a broad term that can refer to a personal conception or an automated system
- “Name” is also ambiguous in this way
- “Account” and “authentication” refer unambiguously to institutional/computer abstractions
- Any account system is only an approximation of the real world

**Real human names are messy**
- Most assumptions your code might make will fail for someone
  - ASCII, length limit, uniqueness, unchanging, etc.
- So, don’t design in assumptions about real names
- Use something more computer-friendly as the core identifier
  - Make “real” names or nicknames a presentation aspect

**Zooko’s triangle**
- Claims (2001) it is hard/impossible for a naming scheme to be simultaneously:
  - Human-meaningful
  - Secure
  - Decentralized
- Too imprecise to be definitively proven/refuted
  - Blockchain-based name systems are highest-profile claimed counterexamples
- A useful heuristic for seeing design tensions

**Identity documents: mostly unhelpful**
- “Send us a scan of your driver’s license”
  - Sometimes called for by specific regulations
  - Unnecessary storage is a disclosure risk
  - Fake IDs are very common

**Identity numbers: mostly unhelpful**
- Common US example: social security number
- Variously used as an identifier or an authenticator
  - Dual use is itself a cause for concern
- Known by many third parties (e.g., banks)
- No checksum, guessing risks
- Published soon after a person dies

**“Identity theft”**
- The first-order crime is impersonation fraud between two other parties
  - E.g., criminal trying to get money from a bank under false pretenses
- The impersonated “victim” is effectively victimized by follow-on false statements
  - E.g., by credit reporting agencies
  - These costs are arguably the result of poor regulatory choices
- Be careful w/ negative info from 3rd parties

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**Users are not ‘ideal components’**
- Frustrates engineers: cannot give users instructions like a computer
  - Closest approximation: military
- Unrealistic expectations are bad for security
Most users are benign and sensible
- On the other hand, you can’t just treat users as adversaries
  - Some level of trust is inevitable
  - Your institution is not a prison
- Also need to take advantage of user common sense and expertise
  - A resource you can’t afford to pass up

Don’t blame users
- “User error” can be the end of a discussion
- This is a poor excuse
- Almost any “user error” could be avoidable with better systems and procedures

Users as rational
- Economic perspective: users have goals and pursue them
  - They’re just not necessarily aligned with security
- Ignoring a security practice can be rational if the rewards is greater than the risk

Perspectives from psychology
- Users become habituated to experiences and processes
  - Learn “skill” of clicking OK in dialog boxes
- Heuristic factors affect perception of risk
  - Level of control, salience of examples
- Social pressures can override security rules
  - “Social engineering” attacks

User attention is a resource
- Users have limited attention to devote to security
  - Exaggeration: treat as fixed
- If you waste attention on unimportant things, it won’t be available when you need it
- Fable of the boy who cried wolf

Research: ecological validity
- User behavior with respect to security is hard to study
- Experimental settings are not like real situations
- Subjects often:
  - Have little really at stake
  - Expect experimenters will protect them
  - Do what seems socially acceptable
  - Do what they think the experimenters want

Research: deception and ethics
- Have to be very careful about ethics of experiments with human subjects
  - Enforced by institutional review systems
- When is it acceptable to deceive subjects?
  - Many security problems naturally include deception