

CSci 4271W  
 Development of Secure Software Systems  
 Day 23: Networking and security

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## Outline

- Brief introduction to networking
- Announcements intermission
- Some classic network attacks
- The web from a security perspective
- SQL injection


## The Internet

- A bunch of computer networks voluntarily interconnected
- Capitalized because there's really only one
- No centralized network-level management
  - But technical collaboration, DNS, etc.


## Layered model (OSI)

7. Application (HTTP)
6. Presentation (MIME?)
5. Session (SSL?)
4. Transport (TCP)
3. Network (IP)
2. Data-link (PPP)
1. Physical (IOBASE-T)

## Layered model: TCP/IP



## Packet wrapping



## IP(v4) addressing

- Interfaces (hosts or routers) identified by 32-bit addresses
  - Written as four decimal bytes, e.g. 192.168.10.2
- First  $k$  bits identify network,  $32 - k$  host within network
  - Can't (anymore) tell  $k$  from the bits
- We'll run out any year now

## IP and ICMP

- Internet Protocol (IP) forwards individual packets
- Packets have source and destination addresses, other options
- Automatic fragmentation (usually avoided)
- ICMP (I Control Message P) adds errors, ping packets, etc.

## UDP

- User Datagram Protocol: thin wrapper around IP
- Adds source and destination port numbers (each 16-bit)
- Still connectionless, unreliable
- OK for some small messages

## TCP

- Transmission Control Protocol: provides reliable bidirectional stream abstraction
- Packets have sequence numbers, acknowledged in order
- Missed packets resent later

## Flow and congestion control

- Flow control: match speed to slowest link
  - "Window" limits number of packets sent but not ACKed
- Congestion control: avoid traffic jams
  - Lost packets signal congestion
  - Additive increase, multiplicative decrease of rate

## Routing

- Where do I send this packet next?
  - Table from address ranges to next hops
- Core Internet routers need big tables
- Maintained by complex, insecure, cooperative protocols
  - Internet-level algorithm: BGP (Border Gateway Protocol)

## Below IP: ARP

- Address Resolution Protocol maps IP addresses to lower-level address
  - E.g., 48-bit Ethernet MAC address
- Based on local-network broadcast packets
- Complex Ethernets also need their own routing (but called switches)

## DNS

- Domain Name System: map more memorable and stable string names to IP addresses
- Hierarchically administered namespace
  - Like Unix paths, but backwards
- `.edu` server delegates to `.ummn.edu` server, etc.

## DNS caching and reverse DNS

- To be practical, DNS requires caching
  - Of positive and negative results
- But, cache lifetime limited for freshness
- Also, reverse IP to name mapping
  - Based on special top-level domain, IP address written backwards

## Classic application: remote login

- Killer app of early Internet: access supercomputers at another university
- Telnet: works cross-OS
  - Send character stream, run regular login program
- rlogin: BSD Unix
  - Can authenticate based on trusting computer connection comes from
  - (Also rsh, rcp)

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## Last day for Wheeler reading quiz

- If you were putting this quiz off until the last day, that's today

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## Packet sniffing

- Watch other people's traffic as it goes by on network
- Easiest on:
  - Old-style broadcast (thin, "hub") Ethernet
  - Wireless
- Or if you own the router

## Forging packet sources

- Source IP address not involved in routing, often not checked
- Change it to something else!
- Might already be enough to fool a naive UDP protocol

## TCP spoofing

- Forging source address only lets you talk, not listen
- Old attack: wait until connection established, then DoS one participant and send packets in their place
- Frustrated by making TCP initial sequence numbers unpredictable
  - Fancier attacks modern attacks are "off-path"

## ARP spoofing

- Impersonate other hosts on local network level
- Typical ARP implementations stateless, don't mind changes
- Now you get victim's traffic, can read, modify, resend

## rlogin and reverse DNS

- rlogin uses reverse DNS to see if originating host is on whitelist
- How can you attack this mechanism with an honest source IP address?

## login and reverse DNS

- login uses reverse DNS to see if originating host is on whitelist
- How can you attack this mechanism with an honest source IP address?
- Remember, ownership of reverse-DNS is by IP address

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## Once upon a time: the static web

- HTTP: stateless file download protocol
  - TCP, usually using port 80
- HTML: markup language for text with formatting and links
- All pages public, so no need for authentication or encryption

## Web applications

- The modern web depends heavily on active software
- Static pages have ads, paywalls, or "Edit" buttons
- Many web sites are primarily forms or storefronts
- Web hosted versions of desktop apps like word processing

## Server programs

- Could be anything that outputs HTML
- In practice, heavy use of databases and frameworks
- Wide variety of commercial, open-source, and custom-written
- Flexible scripting languages for ease of development
  - PHP, Ruby, Perl, etc.

## Client-side programming

- Java: nice language, mostly moved to other uses
- ActiveX: Windows-only binaries, no sandboxing
  - Glad to see it on the way out
- Flash and Silverlight: last important use was DRM-ed video
- Core language: JavaScript

## JavaScript and the DOM

- JavaScript (JS) is a dynamically-typed prototype-OO language
  - No real similarity with Java
- Document Object Model (DOM): lets JS interact with pages and the browser
- Extensive security checks for untrusted-code model

## Same-origin policy

- Origin* is a tuple (scheme, host, port)
  - E.g., (http, www.umn.edu, 80)
- Basic JS rule: interaction is allowed only with the same origin
- Different sites are (mostly) isolated applications

## GET, POST, and cookies

- GET request loads a URL, may have parameters delimited with `?`, `&`, `=`
  - Standard: should not have side-effects
- POST request originally for forms
  - Can be larger, more hidden, have side-effects
- **Cookie**: small token chosen by server, sent back on subsequent requests to same domain

## User and attack models

- "Web attacker" owns their own site (`www.attacker.com`)
  - And users sometimes visit it
  - Realistic reasons: ads, SEO
- "Network attacker" can view and sniff unencrypted data
  - Unprotected coffee shop WiFi

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## Relational model and SQL

- Relational databases have *tables* with *rows* and single-typed *columns*
- Used in web sites (and elsewhere) to provide scalable persistent storage
- Allow complex *queries* in a declarative language SQL

## Example SQL queries

- `SELECT name, grade FROM Students WHERE grade < 60 ORDER BY name;`
- `UPDATE Votes SET count = count + 1 WHERE candidate = 'John';`

## Template: injection attacks

- Your program interacts with an interpreted language
- Untrusted data can be passed to the interpreter
- Attack data can break parsing assumptions and execute arbitrary commands

## SQL + injection

- Why is this named most critical web app. risk?
- Easy mistake to make systematically
- Can be easy to exploit
- Database often has high-impact contents
  - E.g., logins or credit cards on commerce site

## Strings do not respect syntax

- Key problem: assembling commands as strings
- `"WHERE name = '$name';"`
- Looks like `$name` is a string
- Try `$name = "me' OR grade > 80; --"`

## Using tautologies

- Tautology: formula that's always true
- Often convenient for attacker to see a whole table
- Classic: OR 1=1

## Non-string interfaces

- Best fix: avoid constructing queries as strings
- SQL mechanism: prepared statement
  - Original motivation was performance
- Web languages/frameworks often provide other syntax

## Retain functionality: escape

- *Sanitizing* data is transforming it to prevent an attack
- *Escaped* data is encoded to match language rules for literal
  - E.g., \" and \n in C
- But many pitfalls for the unwary:
  - Differences in escape syntax between servers
  - Must use right escape for context: not everything's a string

## Lazy sanitization: allow-listing

- Allow only things you know to be safe/intended
- Error or delete anything else
- Short allow-list is easy and relatively easy to secure
- E.g., digits only for non-negative integer
- But, tends to break benign functionality

## Poor idea: deny-listing

- Space of possible attacks is endless, don't try to think of them all
- Want to guess how many more comment formats SQL has?
- Particularly silly: deny 1=1

## Attacking without the program

- Often web attacks don't get to see the program
  - Not even binary, it's on the server
- Surmountable obstacle:
  - Guess natural names for columns
  - Harvest information from error messages

## Blind SQL injection

- Attacking with almost no feedback
- Common: only "error" or "no error"
- One bit channel you can make yourself: if (x) delay 10 seconds
- Trick to remember: go one character at a time